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Lecture 4

Cryptography

Mobile Business II (SS 2024)

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Agenda

- Introduction
- Symmetric Cryptosystems
- Public Key Cryptography
- Application limits

Cryptographic Systems

- Intention
  - Confidentiality (secrecy of messages):
    encryption systems
  - Integrity (protection from undetected manipulation) and accountability:
    authentication systems and **digital signature systems**
- Key distribution
  - **Symmetric:**
    Both partners have the same key.
  - **Asymmetric:**
    Different (but related) keys for encryption and decryption
- In practice mostly hybrid systems

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- Introduction
- Symmetric Cryptosystems
  - General Concept
  - Caesar Cipher
  - AES
  - Advantages and Problems
- Public Key Cryptography
- Application limits

Symmetric Encryption Systems

- Classical cryptosystems are usually based on symmetric encryption systems.
- Typical applications
  - confidential storage of user data
  - transfer of data between 2 users who negotiate a key via a secure channel
- Examples
  - Vernam-Code (one-time pad, Gilbert Vernam)
    - key length = length of the plaintext (information theoretically secure)
  - DES: Data Encryption Standard
    - key length 56 bit, so 2^{56} different keys
  - AES: Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael, [NIST])
    - 3 alternatives for key length: 128, 192 und 256 bit

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Symmetric Encryption Systems (1)



black box with lock, two equal keys

[based on Federrath and Pfitzmann 1997]

Symmetric Encryption Systems (2)



[based on Federrath and Pfitzmann 1997]

Symmetric Encryption Systems (3)

- **Keys have to be kept secret (*secret key* crypto system).**
- It must not be possible to derive the plaintext or the used keys from the encrypted text (ideally encrypted text is not distinguishable from a numerical random sequence).
- Each key shall be equally probable.
- In principle each system with limited key length is breakable by testing all possible keys.
- **Publication of encoding and decoding functions (algorithms) is considered as good style and is trust-building.**
- **Security of cryptosystems should base on the strength of chosen key lengths.**

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Caesar Cipher

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

- We assign a **number** for every **character**.
- This enables us to calculate with letters as if they were numbers.

Caesar Cipher: Example



Assessment of Caesar Cipher

- Very simple form of encryption.
- The encryption and decryption algorithms are very easy and fast to compute.
- It uses a very limited key space (n=26)
- Therefore, the encryption is very easy and fast to compromise.

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Advanced Encryption Standard

- The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was designed to encipher sensitive but not classified data.
- The standard has been issued in 1977.
- In 1998, a design for a computer system and software that could break any DES-enciphered message within a few days was published.
- By 1999, it was clear that the DES no longer provided the same level of security it had 10 years earlier, and the search was on for a new, stronger cipher.
- AES Rijndael was a winner of U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology bid for advanced encryptions.
- AES has been approved for Secret or even Top Secret information by the NSA.

[Bishop 2005]

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Symmetric Encryption

Advantage: Algorithms are very fast

Algorithm	Performance*
RC6	78 ms
SERPENT	95 ms
IDEA	170 ms
MARS	80 ms
TWOFISH	100 ms
DES-ede	250 ms
RIJNDEAL (AES)	65 ms

* Encryption of 1 MB on a Pentium 2.8 GHz, using the FlexiProvider Java)

[J. Buchmann: Lecture Public Key Infrastrukturen, FG Theoretische Informatik, TU-Darmstadt]

Problems of Symmetric Cryptosystems: Key Exchange



[adopted from J. Buchmann: Lecture Public Key Infrastrukturen, FG Theoretische Informatik, TU-Darmstadt]

Symmetric Encryption: A Possible Solution



[J. Buchmann: Lecture Public Key Infrastrukturen, FG Theoretische Informatik, TU-Darmstadt]

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  - Example: PGP
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Public Key Encryption



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Key Exchange Problem Solved!



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Concept of Asymmetric Encryption Systems

- Public key systems are based on asymmetric encryption.
- Use of ‘corresponding’ key pairs instead of one key:
  - **Public key** is **solely** for encryption.
  - Encrypted text can only be decrypted with the corresponding **private (undisclosed) key**.
- Deriving the private key from the public key is hard (practically impossible).
- The public key can be distributed freely, even via insecure ways (e.g. directory *(public key* crypto system)).

- Messages are encrypted via the public key of the addressee.
- Only the addressee possesses the private key for decoding (and has to manage the relation between the private and the public key).

Asymmetric Encryption Systems



box with slot, access to messages only with a key

[based on Federrath and Pfitzmann 1997]

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Asymmetric Encryption Systems: Examples

- RSA
  - Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, 1978
  - is based on the assumption that the factorization of the product of two (big) prime numbers (p*q) is “difficult” (product is basis for the keys)
  - key lengths typically 1024 bit, today rather 2048

[Rivest et al., 1978]

- Diffie-Hellman
  - Diffie, Hellman, 1976, first patented algorithm with public keys
  - allows the exchange of a secret key
  - is based on the “difficulty” of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field

[Diffie, Hellman, 1976]

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Performance of Public Key Algorithms

Algorithm	Performance*	Performance compared to Symmetric encryption (AES)
RSA (1024 bits)	6.6 s	Factor 100 slower
RSA (2048 bits)	11.8 s	Factor 180 slower

Disadvantage: Complex operations with very big numbers

⇒ **Algorithms are very slow.**

* Encryption of 1 MB on a Pentium 2.8 GHz, using the FlexiProvider (Java)

[J. Buchmann: Lecture Public Key Infrastrukturen, FG Theoretische Informatik, TU-Darmstadt]

Solution: Hybrid Systems



[based on: J. Buchmann 2005: Lecture Public Key Infrastrukturen, FG Theoretische Informatik, TU-Darmstadt]

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Digital Signatures



- Protect the authenticity and integrity of documents signed by A
- B has to get an authentic copy of A's public key.

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Attacks on Public Key Distribution

"Man in the middle attack"



➲ Keys are certified: a 3rd person/institution confirms (with its digital signature) the affiliation of the public key to a person.

Certification of Public Keys (1)

- **B** can freely distribute his own public key.
- But: Everybody (e.g. **C**) could distribute a public key and claim that this one belongs to **B**.
- If **A** uses this key to send a message to **B**, **C** will be able to read this message!
- Thus:
  How can **A** decide if a public key was really created and distributed by **B** without asking **B** directly?

➲ Keys get **certified**, i.e. a third person/institution confirms with its (digital) signature the **affiliation of a public key to entity B**.

➲ Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs)

Certification of Public Keys (2)

Three types of organization for certification systems (PKIs?):

- Central certification authority (CA)
  - A single CA, keys often integrated in checking software
  - Example: older versions of Netscape (CA = Verisign)
- Hierarchical certification system
  - CAs which in turn are certified by “higher” CA
  - Examples: PEM, Teletrust, infrastructure according to Signature Law
- Web of Trust
  - Each owner of a key may serve as a CA
  - Users have to assess certificates on their own
  - Example: PGP (but with hierarchical overlay system)

Hierarchical Certification of Public Keys
(Example: German Signature Law)



- The actual checking of the identity of the key owner takes place at so called Registration Authorities (e.g. notaries, bank branches, T-Points, ...)
- Security of the infrastructure depends on the reliability of the CAs.

Content of a Key Certificate

(according to German Signature Law and Regulation)



Tasks of a Certification Authority
(according to German Signature Law and Regulation)

- Reliable identification of persons who apply for a certificate
- Information on necessary methods for fraud resistant creation of a signature
- Provision for secure storage of the private key
  - at least Smartcard (protected by PIN)
- Publication of the certificate (if wanted)
- Barring of certificates
- If necessary issuing of time stamps
  - for a fraud resistant proof that an electronic document has been at hand at a specific time

Requirements to an Accredited CA
(according to German Signature Law and Regulation)

- Checking of the following items by certain confirmation centers (BSI, TÜVIT, ...)
  - Concept of operational security
  - Reliability of the executives and of the employees as well as of their know-how
  - Financial power for continuous operation
  - Exclusive usage of licensed technical components according to SigG and SigV
  - Security requirements as to operating premises and their access controls
- Possibly license of the regulation authority

Web of Trust



- Each user can act as a "CA".
- Mapping of the social process of creation of trust.
- Keys are "certified" through several signatures.
- Expansion is possible by public key servers and (hierarchical) CAs.

Web of Trust Example



Web of Trust:

- Certification of the public keys mutually by users
- Level of the mutual trust is adjustable.

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Protection of Email Example PGP

- PGP = Pretty Good Privacy
  - De facto-Standard for freely accessible e-mail encryption systems on the Internet
  - First implementation by Phil Zimmermann
  - Long trial against Phil Zimmermann because of suspicion of violation of export clauses
  - In U.S., free version in cooperation with MIT (agreement with RSA because of the patent)
  - Meanwhile commercialized: www.pgp.com
  - Gnu Privacy Guard (GPG): non-commercial Open Source variant (OpenPGP, RFC2440)

OpenPGP: Encrypt Message



OpenPGP: Decrypt Message

Betreff: MB II Slides
Von: Katja Liesebach <katja.liesebach@m-chair.net>
Datum: 19:18
An: Christian Kahl <christian.kahl@m-chair.net>

```
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Charset: ISO-8859-15
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozil

hQEOAzxc3rSs71RREAQAoa4NK8beVOV
iEsWpm1xA11HIpTZtIKd9ecdjVlOFOJ
6xkXLtS6PkSb0k5nKkMZ1147F80IrvW
/0md5jClR8N/NJeuSfsW6w1LUpTVHQQ
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=eEkh
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
```



Betreff: MB II Slides
Von: Katja Liesebach <katja.liesebach@m-chair.net>
Datum: 19:18
An: Christian Kahl <christian.kahl@m-chair.net>

Hi Christian,

please find attached the MB II slides for lecture 7.

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Dipl.-Medien-inf. Katja Liesebach

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PGP-Certification of Keys

- Certification of public keys by users: “Web of Trust”
- Differentiation between ‘validity’ and ‘trust’
  - ‘Trust’ :
    trust that a person / an institution signs keys only if their authenticity has really been checked
  - ‘Validity’ :
    A key is valid for me if it has been signed by a person / an institution I trust (ideally by myself).
- Support through key-servers:
  - Collection of keys
  - Allocation of ‘validity’ and ‘trust’ remains task of the users
- Path server:
  Finding certification paths between keys

OpenPGP: Key Management



Key-Server


OpenPGP-Schlüssel herunterladen
Schlüssel gefunden - Auswählen zum Importieren
Benutzer-ID
Erstellt
Schlüssel-ID
Kai R. Rannenberg <kair@microsoft.com>
1997-03-09
8EF041F1
kara <kara@iig.uni-freiburg.de>
1997-09-18
AF1FDF70
kara <kara@telematik.iig.uni-freiburg.de>
1997-03-09
6623E0DD
OK
Abbrechen
Schlüssel-Server auswählen
Suche nach Schlüssel
Kai Rannenberg
Schlüssel-Server
subkeys.pgp.net
OK
Abbrechen

PGP: Public Key Catalogs



- Network of public-key servers:
  - www.cam.ac.uk.pgp.net/pgpnet/email-key-server-info.html
  - http://pgp.mit.edu/

PGP: Practical Attacks and Weaknesses

- Brute-Force-Attacks on the pass phrase
  - PGPCrack for conventionally encrypted files
- Trojan horses, changed PGP-Code
  - e.g. predictable random numbers, encryption with an additional key
- Attacks on the computer of the user
  - Not physically deleted files
  - Paged memory
  - Keyboard monitoring
- Analysis of electromagnetic radiation
- Non-technical attacks
- Confusion of users [Whitten, Tygar 1999]

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- Application limits
  - Replay Attacks
  - Side-Channel Attacks
  - The Human Element

Application limits

"Anybody who asserts that a problem is readily solved by encryption, understands neither encryption nor the problem."

(Roger Needham / Butler Lampson)

[Marshall Symposium 1998] [Randell 2004]

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Example: Keyless Entry System

- Solution: Protect communication with crypto?
- e.g. symmetric cryptography + hash/signature



Replay Attack: Eavesdrop



Replay Attack: Replay



Replay Attack: Solution

- e.g. Challenge-Response helps



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  - Side-Channel Attacks
  - The Human Element

Side-Channel Attacks I

- A secure cryptoalgorithm does not imply that the implementation is also secure

Source: Eran Tromer

Side-Channel Attacks II

- Side-Channels: Time, Power, Noise, Radiation, ...



Source: CESCA



Source: Gilbert Goodwill

- Other data (side-channel) leaks information
- Conclusion on processed bits possible

Agenda

- Introduction
- Symmetric Cryptosystems
- Public Key Cryptography
- Application limits
  - Replay Attacks
  - Side-Channel Attacks
  - The Human Element

The Human Element



Source: https://xkcd.com/538/

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Human Element: Behavior and Passwords

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3. Norberg, P.A., Horne, D.R. & Horne, D.A., 2007. The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors. *Journal of Consumer Affairs*, 41(1), pp.100–126.

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